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Dozens of human cases infected with H7N9 subtype avian influenza virus (AIV) have been confirmed in China since March, 2013. 
Distribution data of sexes, ages, professions and regions of the cases were analyzed in this report. The results showed that the 
elderly cases, especially the male elderly, were significantly more than expected, which is different from human cases of H5N1 
avian influenza and human cases of the pandemic H1N1 influenza. The outbreak was rated as a Grade III (severe) outbreak, and it 
would evolve into a Grade IV (very severe) outbreak soon, using a method reported previously. The H7N9 AIV will probably 
circulate in humans, birds and pigs for years. Moreover, with the driving force of natural selection, the virus will probably evolve 
into highly pathogenic AIV in birds, and into a deadly pandemic influenza virus in humans. Therefore, the H7N9 outbreak has 
been assumed severe, and it is likely to become very or extremely severe in the future, highlighting the emergent need of forceful 
scientific measures to eliminate any infected animal flocks. We also described two possible mild scenarios of the future evolution 
of the outbreak. 
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Human cases infected with H7N9 subtype avian influenza 
virus (AIV) emerged in China in recent months [13]. The 
H7N9 influenza toll has climbed to 91 on April 19. Among 
the 91 confirmed cases, 17 died. This outbreak aroused 
great global concerns, due to it being the first time in recent 
decades that an AIV has caused multiple human severe in-
fections in a wide region during a short period. It is highly 
desired to timely reveal the epidemiological features and 
risk of the outbreak [13]. We elucidated here the sex, age, 
professional, and geographical distribution of the first 91 
cases, the transmission and severity of the outbreak, as well 
as the risk of the outbreak in the future. 
1  Data sources and analysis methods 
Case data were from online official reports. Differences 
with P <0.05 using the χ2 test were assumed to be statisti-
cally significant, if not specified. 
2  Clinical and demographic characteristics of 
the first 91 cases 
Of the first 91 cases, 86 were of known clinical signs. 
Among them, 88.37% (76/86) developed severe and acute 
respiratory symptoms including pneumonia, and 17 had 
died. The case fatality rate was approximately 18.68%, sig-
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nificantly higher than that of the SARS outbreak in China in 
2003 (6.44%) [4]. From the data of 13 fatalities of known 
relevant data, the interval between the occurrence of symp-
toms and death of the fatal cases was 12.22 (mean)  6.76 d 
(standard deviation).  
Of the first 91 cases, 87 were of known sexes and ages. 
Among them, males (n = 61) were significantly more than 
females (n = 26), and 3 were 019-year-old, 13 were 20 
39-year-old, 23 were 4059-year-old, 48 were ≥60-year-old. 
Compared with the age distribution of the total population 
in China [5], the cases were significantly fewer for the 
groups of 019-year-old and 2039-year-old, and signifi-
cantly more for the group of ≥60-year-old (Figure 1). 
The sex and age distribution of the H7N9 cases was quite 
different from that of the human cases of H5N1 avian in-
fluenza occurring in 20032006, and that of human cases of 
the pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009 (Figure 1). Both of 
the later two outbreaks exhibited no sex difference. Moreo-
ver, for the H5N1 and pandemic H1N1 cases, elder cases 
of >60-year-old were significantly fewer than expected 
(both covering <5% of the total cases), and young cases of 
<40-year-old, especially for those of 019-year-old, were 
significantly higher than expected, both covering >80% of 
the total cases [6,7]. Figure 1 also showed that the age dis-
tribution of H7N9 cases was similar to the SARS outbreak 
in 2003 in China in that the group of 019-year-old were 
significantly fewer than expected, but different from the 
SARS outbreak in that elder cases of >60-year-old were sig-
nificantly fewer than expected for the SARS outbreak [4]. 
Among the 87 cases with known ages, males of ≥60- 
year-old (n = 36) were significantly more than females of 
≥60-year-old (n = 12), but males of <60-year-old (n = 25) 
were not significantly more than females of <60-year-old (n 
= 14).  
The elderly are usually weaker than the young, and elder 
males are usually further weaker than elder females, which 
could be seen from the fact that males are of the mean life-
time 5 years shorter than that of females in China [5]. Possi-
bly due to the virus having not been fully adapted to humans, 
it invaded mainly the weak. Therefore, especially elder male 
cases were significantly more than expected. 
Most (86) of the first 91 cases were from the lower 
reaches of the Yangtze River covering three provinces 
(Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang) and the city of Shanghai, and 
five cases were from Henan province and Beijing. Their 
infection sites formed an area larger than 500000 km2.  
Of the first 91 cases, 71 were of known professions. 
Among them, 95.77% (68/71) were the retired, peasants, 
bird transporters or sellers, cookers, or of no formal profes-
sions, with only three exceptions in the groups of officials, 
students, teachers, medical staffs, etc. More than a half of 
the cases were of recent history exposed to live birds, espe-
cially live birds in markets. Of the first 91 cases, only two 
pairs were from the same families, and no sound evidences 
supported human-to-human transmission between them. 
Among the total of 1108 close contacts of the first cases 
reported online, only two (namely the two in the two pairs 
from the same families) were identified as H7N9 cases. All 
these data suggest that the virus could not transmit among 
humans. This further suggests that most of the first 91 cases 
were infected with the virus from infected animals. 
3  Severity rating of the H7N9 influenza out-
break 
Severity rating of an outbreak of infectious diseases is im-
portant in infection control. Currently, a method has been 
formulated to rate the severity of a human infectious disease 




Figure 1  The age distribution of the total population in 2011, human cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009, human cases of H5N1 avian influenza in 
20032006, human cases of SARS in 2003 in China, and human H7N9 cases in 2003 at its early stage. “△” means significant higher than expected, and “▽” 
means the reverse. 
 Zhuang Q Y, et al.   Chin Sci Bull   September (2013) Vol.58 No.26 3185 
severity of clinical signs, transmission of the infectious dis-
ease, case number and the infection source (Table 1). The 
scores of these four aspects are then multiplied. The resulted 
product determines the severity of the outbreak. The higher 
products represent more serious outbreaks. The product in 
the range of 1–14, 1529, 3059, 60119, 120200 and 
200450 rate the severity of the outbreak as Grades I (mild), 
II (moderate), III (severe), IV (very severe), V (too severe) 
and VI (extremely severe), respectively.  
As of April 18, 2013, the scores of the severity of clinical 
signs, transmission of the infectious disease, case number 
and the infection source were 5, 1, 3 and 3, respectively. 
The product of these scores was 45, which indicates that the 
severity of the current H7N9 influenza outbreak was at the 
severe level (Grade III). Its severity is lower than the SARS 
outbreak in China in 2003 which was of the score product 
80 at its early stage [8]. In general, the severity of an infec-
tious disease outbreak is dynamic, and it may be rated higher 
or lower when more characteristics of the outbreak are re-
vealed or changed [8]. From the toll increase trend, we think 
that the H7N9 outbreak will become a Grade IV (very se-
vere) outbreak at the end of this April, because the toll will 
exceed 100 at that time. 
4  Possible enormous risk of the H7N9 influenza 
outbreak 
We think that the H7N9 influenza outbreak is of enormous 
risk for the following reasons. 
Firstly, as elucidated above, it is a Grade III (severe) and 
is to be a Grade IV (very severe) outbreak soon. Most of the 
confirmed cases developed severe symptoms, and 18.68% 
of them had died, indicating that the virus is of high patho-
genicity to humans.  
Secondly, since most of the first 91 human cases were 
infected with the virus from infected animals, and domestic 
birds infected with the virus have been identified in Anhui, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai, indicating that the virus 
has spread to a wide region. In effect, the confirmed human 
cases and the confirmed bird infections were likely only a 
small portion of the reality, according to the iceberg phe-
nomenon principle in epidemiology [9].  
Thirdly, beyond that the virus can infect humans and 
birds, we think that the virus can also infect pigs which 
support circulation of both AIVs and human influenza vi-
ruses [10]. Additionally, it cannot exclude that the virus will 
not circulate in horse flocks after it has accumulated some 
mutations if it will circulate widely in the nature, as H7 
subtype influenza virus had widely circulated in horses in 
the world for decades of the last century [11].  
Fourthly, it is difficult to identify the humans, birds or 
pigs infected with the H7N9 virus from clinical signs, and it 
is extremely tough to conduct large-scale detection or sur-
veillance to identify the virus infections in humans, birds, or 
pigs for a long period. 
Fifthly, since the virus has spread widely, and it can in-
fect humans, birds and pigs, and it is difficult to identify 
infected humans, birds and pigs, we think it is extremely 
tough to eliminate the virus in China, and infections of the 
virus in humans, birds and pigs will continue for a long pe-
riod, possibly for more than ten years. 
Table 1  Scoring of four aspects of the H7N9 and SARS outbreaks at the early stage a) 
Aspects Description Score H7N9 SARS 
Clinical signs  
Mild, usually requiring treatment without hospitalization 2   
Severe, usually requiring hospitalization, but without severe outcomes like death, abortion or body abnormality 3   
Severe, <10% cases having developed severe outcomes like death, abortion or body abnormality  4  √ 
Very severe, 10%‒20% cases having developed severe outcomes like death, abortion or body abnormality 5 √  
Very severe, >20% cases having developed severe outcomes like death, abortion or body abnormality 6   
Transmission 
No evidences supporting person-to-person transmission 1 √  
Transmission through special behaviors such as sex is probable 2   
Transmission among frequent close contacts is probable 3   
Transmission among casual close contacts transmission is probable 4  √ 
Transmission among people without close contact is probable  5   
Case number 
1‒9 1   
10‒50 2   
51‒100 3 √  
101‒200 4   
>200 5  √ 
Infection source a) 
Without links to domestic animals  1  √ 
With a possible link to domestic animals 2   
With a clear evidence to support domestic animals are infection source 3 √  
a) The H7N9 outbreak data were as of 04/19/2013, while the SARS data were as of 03/09/2003. 
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Sixthly, due to the great populations of birds and pigs 
raised in China, low-level biosecurity of many live bird 
markets, low-level biosecurity of many small-scale poultry 
and swine farms in China [12], the frequent transportation 
of live birds and live pigs, and rapid transmission of the 
virus in the hosts it has adapted to, the virus will likely 
spread rapidly to other regions. It may be possible for the 
virus to spread to other countries via wild bird migration, 
and at least one wild bird infected with the virus has been 
found in Jiangsu province. 
Seventhly, considering the previous circulation history of 
H7 subtype in some countries, the novel H7N9 virus may 
mutate into highly pathogenic AIV during its future proba-
ble long circulation in birds, which will be as disastrous as 
H5N1 highly pathogenic AIV having been circulating in 
many countries for years. 
Eighthly, the probable long existence of the H7N9 virus 
in humans will provide the driving force to the virus to 
adapt to humans through mutations. The virus may thus 
obtain human-to-human transmission, and may spark a pan-
demic influenza thereafter. The possible pandemic should 
likely be very dangerous with the consideration that the virus 
has showed highly pathogenicity in the first 91 cases.  
Some experts thought that the H7N9 outbreak was not 
that serious. They mainly analyzed the present status rather 
than its future development. Additionally, some people may 
think that the possible H7N9 pandemic influenza should not 
be that deadly, as we have just passed through the pandemic 
influenza caused by the novel swine H1N1 influenza virus 
emerging in 2009. However, influenza pandemics caused by 
different virus strains may be of different severity [13]. The 
H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009 was mild mainly because 
seasonal H1N1 influenza viruses had widely circulated in 
humans for decades before the pandemic, which resulted in 
some immunity in humans against the novel pandemic 
H1N1 virus, especially in the elderly (so their infections 
were much fewer, as showed by Figure 1). In contrast, H7 
subtype influenza virus has never widely circulated in hu-
mans, and thus persons of all ages are likely susceptible to 
the virus infection. Therefore, the future possible H7N9 
pandemic will be likely more severe than the pandemic 
H1N1 influenza in 2009. 
In light of the above considerations, we think that the 
H7N9 outbreak is severe, and it is likely to become very or 
extremely severe in the future, highlighting the emergent 
need of forceful scientific measures, such as building 
enough stockpile of H7N9 vaccine for human use in case 
the pandemic really occurs. The successful elimination of 
Nipah virus in swine population in Malaysia in 1998 and 
SARS coronavirus in China in 2003 has demonstrated the 
effect of forceful scientific measures in eliminating danger-
ous infectious disease outbreaks at their early stages [14,15]. 
Forceful scientific measures, such as massive replacement 
of traditional live bird markets with modern low-cost sani-
tary electronic live bird markets far away from residential 
areas [16], will be useful not only in the control of the 
H7N9 outbreak, but also in the control of many other infec-
tious diseases. 
5  Possible mild risk of the H7N9 influenza out-
break 
We do not exclude completely the possibility that the H7N9 
will disappear naturally, or maintain its low pathogenicity in 
birds and limited transmission ability in humans for a long 
period, without forceful scientific control measures. How-
ever, such a mild scenario of the outbreak evolution is of 
less possibility than the very or extremely severe scenario 
describe above. The main reason is that some random muta-
tions leading to the improved adaption of the virus to hu-
mans will emerge naturally during its long existence in hu-
mans, as the virus usually evolves rapidly. These mutants 
will become dominant by natural selection as they are more 
adaptive in humans. They thus may spread in humans rap-
idly and can spark a deadly pandemic. Similarly, the H7N9 
virus of low pathogenicity in birds is more likely to become 
highly pathogenic through natural selection.  
Possibly only one natural force exists inhibiting the dan-
gerous development of the H7N9 outbreak, namely the 
structural constraint of the virus [17]. That is to say, the 
mutations leading to human-to-human transmission of the 
virus, or leading to high pathogenicity of the virus in birds 
are also fatal to the virus itself. Another ideal scenario is 
that the virus was generated in live bird markets, and it has 
not spread to many poultry farms, and it will not spread to 
many poultry farms, and it will disappear with closure of 
live bird markets in related regions. We assume that some 
parts rather than the whole ideal scenario are possible. The 
future real status may be between the worst and the best 
scenarios given above. 
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